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its time. Perhaps the legal profession should include in its modem
schooling something of the Bauhaus philosophy.
Ronald L. Goldfarb
Member, New York and
California Bars
THE SUPREME COURT ON TRiL. By Charles S. Hyneman. New
York: Atherton Press. 1963. Pp. ix, 308. $6.50.

The Supreme Court on Trial is a purported examination of the
Court as a repository of political power. More particularly, it seeks
to determine whether the power of judicial review is fundamentally
compatible with principles of representative government,' whether
the Court acquired the power of judicial review by grant or by
usurpation,2 and whether that power has been exercised with wisdom and restraint. While the author avoids a direct expression of
his own opinions, the materials he has selected leave the clear impression that the Court is guilty of capricious conduct and undemocratic self-aggrandizement.
These charges have been made before, of course, and it is unclear precisely why their reiteration was warranted in a new book.
In view of the voluminous literature already available, moreover,
it is somewhat disconcerting that the author fails to supply appropriate footnotes duly acknowledging familiar authority for many
of his observations. Instead, he rests a number of propositions on
vague references to "most thoughtful persons," "many informed
and thoughtful observers," "some persons," "many thoughtful persons," "many people," and "thoughtful men" without specification.
This deficiency is not fully offset by the lightweight bibliography
provided at the end of the volume. Nevertheless, Professor Hyneman's treatment of the otigin, legitimacy, and uses of judicial review is generally well composed, tightly organized, and fairly convincing. If these subjects comprised the whole of the author's work,
the book could be fairly appraised as a useful addition to the literature on judicial review.
The problem is, however, that the book turns out to be less
significant for what it restates on these matters than for what it
asserts regarding the Supreme Court's treatment of race relations.
In many respects it is Brown v. Board of Educ.8 which dominates
the discussion; judicial review tends largely to sketch the general
1. For a recent and provocative treatment of this theme, not cited in the present
work, see Hooy, THm PARADOXEs OF FREEDOM (1962).
2. For a recent discussion, not cited in the present work, see MASON, THE SUPREME
COURT; PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM (1962).

3. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
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setting for a specific and highly critical treatment of Brown. In
fact, the durability of The Supreme Court on Trial is more likely
to depend upon its assessment of the desegregation cases as a particular exercise of judicial review than upon the more general
treatment of judicial review itself. And because of the unfortunate
assessment of those cases, it may be that the book will not endure.
Starting from the premise that the Constitution sanctioned
governmentally-compelled segregation until 1954, 4 Professor Hyneman broadly implies that the Supreme Court decided Brown incorrectly as a matter of law, that the Court was performing a legislative function beyond its legitimate powers, and that the Court
thereby raised itself to a peak of power without precedent in the
nation's history. It appears, however, that the author has indulged
in a partisan presentation which overlooks a vast amount of competent authority on this highly charged subject.
Following an introductory comparison of Brown and Plessy,
for instance, the author lays out the criticisms of the Supreme
Court by the 1958 Conference of State Chief Justices. The Committee Report preceding the Conference Resolutions is described
and quoted for its "remarkably restrained language." 5 The positioning of the Report in the book implies that the state chief
justices were reacting to the Court's work in race relations. The
author does not mention, however, "that there is not one iota of
criticism in the Conference's Resolution or Report which is directed to the School Segregation Cases,"6 "neither a mention nor
an allusion to [those] decisions in the Report." 7 Nor does the text
offer a single rejoinder to the Report. Instead, a single line in
bibliographic notes at the end of the volume refers to Dean Rostow's reply to the chief justices.8 But since Dean Rostow is elsewhere identified in the book as an activist sympathizer of the
Court,9 the reader is discouraged from examining the Rostow article or from taking it very seriously. The fact is, however, that the
Conference Report has been exhaustively canvassed in books and
articles never acknowledged in this work.10 The consensus is that
4. P. 10: "It will be clear from what has been said that, up to the 1954 decision
of Brown v. Board of Education, the constitutional law of the country permitted
discriminatory treatment on the basis of race or color as long as a decent showing was
made that the treatment accorded one race was equal to that accorded the other."
5. P. 23.
6 KURLAND, The Supreme Court and Its Judicial Critics, 6 UTAH L. Rav. 457 (1959).
7. Weissman, Report of the Committee of the Conference of the State Chief
Justices on Federal-State Relationships as Affected by Judicial Decisions, 19 LAw.
Gumn REv. 6, 8 (1959).
8. P. 283. The reference is to Rostow, The Court and Its Critics, 4 So. TEx. L.J.
160 (1959).
9. Pp. 218, 222-23, 264-66, 272.
10. In addition to articles cited supra, see, e.g., FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF
TIM UNrrED STATES 177, 188 (1916): "The thrust of the criticism by the state chief
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the criticisms of the state chief justices were substantially without
foundation, reflecting far more discredit on their promulgators than
on the Supreme Court. And the point here is that the failure to
mention these articles in this book is, unfortunately, an example of
the oversights which significantly detract from the work as a whole.
The character of the desegregation discussion is even more evident in the author's concentration on criticisms of Brown to the
exclusion of arguments in its favor elsewhere examined among
more than three hundred articles and books occasioned by that case.
Thus, scarcely a mention is accorded the many materials elaborating and defending the following arguments in favor of the correctness of the decision:
First, the Court of 1954 correctly interpreted the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and merely rectified
previous judicial errors of the Reconstruction Court which had
emasculated the Civil War Amendments and legislation during the
thirty years following the Civil War."1 Plessy itself was inconsistent
with a case then twenty-three years old, which had understood the
War Congress to mean that physically equal but separate transportation facilities did not satisfy the federal standard. 2 Indeed, Plessy
contained statements regarding the proper means of reconciling
whites and Negroes which were rendered impossible of accomplishment because of the very type of law given sanction by the decision
itself. Thus, Mr. Justice Brown wrote:
"If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it
must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation
of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.
• * Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences . ...13
justices seems to me, in short, to have been misdirected. There has been no real
invasion of state authority; on the contrary, there has been growing acceptance of
state legislation in matters that really count for the states."; Lewis, The Supreme
Court and Its Critics, 45 MINN. L. REv. 305 (1961); Lockhart, A Response to the Conference of State Chief Justices, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 802 (1959); McKay, The Supreme
Court and Its Lawyer Critics, 28 FoRDHAm L. REv. 615, 626-36 (1960); Monroe, The
Supreme Court on Trial: A Perspective, 11 HAsrxNos L.J. 369 (1960).
11. See, e.g., Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MicI. L. REv. 1323 (1952). The eviscerating cases were these: Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1 (1906); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S.
678 (1887); In re Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1882); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); In re Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The first of these, the Slaughter-House Cases, reduced the
content of privileges and immunities of United States citizenship to such a low state

that one can scarcely imagine such content was all the proponents had in mind in
framing a constitutional amendment. See also HARRis, Tin QUEST FOR EQUALry
(1960); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950).
12. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).
13. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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But the decision, it will be recalled, did not provide merely that
individual white persons could voluntary dissociate themselves from
racial contacts they might personally and individually find offensive.
Rather, it provided that state governments could compel segregation of the races by law, regardless of any willingness of many individuals to share a railroad car without regard to the color of other
occupants, and without regard to the desires of the management of
the railroad. Under the system of law-coerced segregation which
emerged after Plessy, the opportunities for integration through voluntary consent, mutual appreciation, and natural affinities, of which
Mr. Justice Brown wrote so glowingly, were cut off. The opinion by
Mr. Justice Brown, quoted at length by Professor Hyneman, should
most certainly be tested against the historic dissents of Mr. Justice
Harlan, who is never mentioned. 14 Moreover, the extension of
Plessy (a transportation case) to sanction coerced segregation in public education would have required a degree of judicial inventiveness, in view of the fact that the issue of segregation in public schools
could scarcely have occupied the attention of the country at the time
the fourteenth amendment was adopted.' 5
Second, even assuming the correctness of Plessy, in some sense and
at the time, the years between 1896 and 1954 witnessed developments which required its overruling unless the Court were to recommit itself to a foolish and hopeless surface consistency:
(a) In 1896, legislatively coerced segregation was a new device of
undetermined significance. Only during the ensuing twenty years
did it develop into a rigid and pervasive regime effectively forcing
the separation of the races in nearly every walk of life.' 6 The Plessy
Court may not have anticipated the effect of its decision in cementing the re-establishment of white supremacy in the South, nor of
the decision's systematic extension to extinguish the prospect of a
voluntary coming together by the races. Had the Court been able
14. See, e.g., id. at 559: "In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in
time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the
Dred Scott case."
15. Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MODERN L. REv. 345,
350 (1958): "In 1868 state-supported schools were rare in the South, and Negro education of any sort virtually non-existent there. It would be pointless to seek in the
minds of the statesmen of 1868 a definite answer to the question of the meaning of
'equal protection' in the 1950's when public schools have become the rule and Negroes
have proved that in capacity for learning and teaching, differences are individual
rather than racial."
16. See WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955); Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421-22 (1960): "The question of the
'intent' of the men of 1866 on segregation as we know it calls for a far chancier guess
than is commonly supposed, for they were unacquainted with the institution as it
prevails in the American South today. To guess their verdict upon the institution as
it functions in the midtwentieth century supposes an imaginary hypothesis which
grows more preposterous as it is sought to be made more vivid."
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to anticipate the practical consequences, it might not have decided
as it did.
(b) Early in the twentieth century, twelve years after Plessy, the
Brandeis brief was legitimated. The practice of deciding issues of
17
fact by sterile reference to "legal" facts began to be eroded.
Whether women might be harmed by being required to work more
than ten hours a day, for instance, was tested by a meticulous examination of all relevant data.' 8 It was scarcely to be expected that the
Court would be less scrupulous forty-six years later in reviewing the
political, sociological, and psychological presuppositions of Plessy
than it was in examining the legislative facts in Muller v. Oregon.
(c) In 1896, the disciplines of sociology, cultural anthropology,
and psychology were embryonic. By 1954, it had become apparent
from research in these developing disciplines that nineteenth-century presuppositions regarding the character of inherent racial differences and the effects of segregation on Negroes were extremely
doubtful. Even assuming that the normative standard of equal protection is to be treated as a historical constant, therefore, superior
technique and information in measuring whether that standard
was in fact satisfied under conditions of coerced segregation necessarily would alter particular findings of fact.' 9
(d) Years after Plessy, but years before Brown, the NAACP established itself as a law-oriented organization. It was vastly better
equipped than earlier litigants or amici to prepare cases and to take
full advantage of developments respecting the Biandeis brief and
new information provided by the emerging sociological disciplines. 20 As the lopsided character of earlier litigation-which frequently was adversary in name only-was gradually redressed, so
too the lopsidedness of judicial results was bound to be corrected.
(e) Brown itself did not spring full-blown from the Supreme
Court in 1954. Commencing no later than 1917 and reacting to developments noted above, the Court gradually moved away from the
tenor of the reconstruction cases. 21 Four years prior to Brown, the
17. See Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 VAND. L. REV. 783 (1958).
18. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

19. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 10, at 331: "An earlier Court, applying the sociology
of its day, had found that racial segregation did not deny Negroes the equal protection
of the laws because there was nothing invidious about the arrangement unless they
chose 'to put that construction upon it.' But could any rational person doubt in
1954 that racial segregation was a calculated device to exalt one group and debase
another, whether practiced in Mississippi, the Union of South Africa or Hitler's
Germany? A Court would have to be obtuse indeed to find nothing invidious in a rule
requiring Negro children--or Jewish children, say, or Mexican children-to attend
separate schools."
20. See VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959).
21. Unmentioned by Professor Hyneman is the fact that the Court rejected
the rationale of separate but equal in 1917, in invalidating a racial zoning ordinance.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Beginning with Guinn v. United States, 258
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Court had made it clear that physically separate facilities for certain
educational disciplines could never be equal. By 1954, the separatebut-equal doctrine had become scarcely more than a shell of state
laws devoted to the systematic degradation of Negroes.
The conviction that the desegregation cases have been unjustly
treated in this book is fortified by several other coincidences.
Shortly following a r~sum6 of these cases, for instance, there is a
summary of criticisms of other particular exercises of judicial review by the Court. These criticisms in turn serve as a prologue for
a reconsideration of Marbury v. Madison, "in order to see whether
men may reasonably doubt, and to inspect the grounds for doubting, that the power of judges to nullify statutes was vested in them
by the Constitution." 22 There follows a thirty-one page examination
of Marbury and a restatement of familiar objections to that case.
This critique of Marbury, in turn, is made to appear relevant to
the Warren Court's treatment of the desegregation cases. This appearance of relevance proceeds from the fact that the author fails to
distinguish the criticisms legitimately made of judicial review by
the Supreme Court of acts of Congress from judicial review of state
laws, like those principally involved in the desegregation cases.
Thus, in introducing the discussion of Marbury, the author writes
of "the power of judges to nullify statutes," and not merely of the
power to nullify federal statutes. It should have been made explicit,
however, that the alleged infirmities of Marbury by no means necessarily bear upon the separate question of the Court's final authority to review state laws. The most caustic of the Marbury critics, Professor Crosskey, carefully distinguished the two levels of
judicial review:
U.S. 347 (1915), the Court gradually extended the availability of the franchise which
had been withdrawn from the Negro near the turn of the century. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v.
Allwright, 521 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The shift in
housing, commencing with Buchanan, supra, was stepped up in Shelly v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948) and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the latter case serving six years
later to provide the fifth amendment implied equal protection basis for Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The "doctrine" of Shelley, of course, is potentially of
enormously greater significance than that of Brown v. Board of Educ. The decision in
Brown was signalled by Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938),
Sipuel v. Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), as noted but
not elaborated upon by Professor Hyneman at 11. See, FREUND, op. cit. supra note 10, at
173: "A final obvious fact is that the decisions were not an abrupt departure in constitutional law or a novel interpretation of the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The old doctrine of separate-but-equal, announced in 1896, had been steadily eroded
for at least a generation before the school cases, in the way that precedents are whittled
down until they finally collapse." John Frank correctly described Sweatt when he wrote:
"The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Vinson, took the position, in essence, that
legal education could never be both separate and equal, and that the inequality was
inherent in the very act of separation itself." FRANK, MAnL
PALACE 212 (1958).
22. P. 93.
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"[J]udicial review was intended to be provided as to the acts
of the states, but not as to the acts of Congress....P
"And its meaning, as before suggested, can surely not be
doubted: judicial review was meant to be provided as to all
the legislative
enactments of the states, but not as to those of
24
Congress."

Another distinguished critic of Marbury, Professor Corwin, has
noted:
"Most of the criticism of judicial review is directed, it should
be noted, against review of acts of Congress, although it is
today rarely exercised adversely to such acts. That there must
of state action by the Supreme Court is
be a central review 25
generally conceded."
Similarly, Professor Powell takes account of the familiar distinction between Marbury, involving horizontal judicial review, and
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and Gohens v. Virginia, on vertical
supremacy:
"Neither Hamilton nor Marshall falls into the error of invoking the judicial power to condemn state conduct in conflict
with the existence or with the exercise of national powers and
contending that this implies a corresponding Supreme Court
power over acts of Congress. The former judicial authority
finds clear warrant in the so-called supremacy clause of the
Constitution .... 26
"The Supreme Court's power over state legislation was plainly
if not explicitly
indicated in the supremacy clause of the
Constitution." 27
And nearly every student of constitutional law will recall Holmes'
observation:
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if
we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do
think the Union would be imperiled if we could28 not make
that declaration as to the laws of the several States."
It is true, of course, that even the doctrine of vertical judicial
supremacy remains open to the argument that in reviewing state
laws, the Court should be guided by congressional interpretations
of the Constitution rather than by its own interpretation. This is
25. 2 CROSSKEY, Pouics

AND THE CONSTITUTION 987 (1953).

24. Id. at 990.
25. CORWIN & PELTASON, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION

37 (1958).

26. POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARInEs IN CONSIuiONAL INTERPRrATION 16 (1956).

27. Id. at 22.
28. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs

295-96 (1920).
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an argument, however, which is not resolved by a consideration of
Marbury v. Madison.
The author's treatment of the Hughes Court, which invalidated
federal statutes during the early Roosevelt Administration, is
used to criticize again the desegregation cases. The author suggests
that a discussion of the depression cases will "prepare the reader
for critical evaluation of my appraisal of the Segregation cases.''29
Yet it never becomes clear just how the two subjects are connected.
That some Justices of the Hughes Court were wedded to Spencerian economics and ought, perhaps, to have used their veto over
Congress more sparingly at that time and in those circumstances
are observations which contribute little to an analysis of the reasonableness of the Warren Court's response to the crisis in race relations in 1954, or of its right to review state laws.
The feeling that the desegregation cases are the real subject of
this book, and that the nominal topic-distribution of political
power in a democracy-emerges as a secondary subject, goes deeper still. The lead paragraph of the jacket lays initial stress on the
author's assertions concerning the desegregation cases rather than
on the larger theme of political power. It adverts to the author's
new observation about these cases, accurately reflecting the author's
twice-presented view,30 in the following words:
"Professor Hyneman shows convincingly that the Supreme
Court raised itself to a new peak of power in its orders outlawing segregation. In other and older constitutional crises, the
Court thwarted the reform efforts of elected lawmakers. By
holding those efforts invalid, it restored the previous and
familiar state of law. In its new role, the Supreme Court is the
initiator of reform."
The reference to "other and older constitutional crises," in which
"the Court thwarted the reform efforts of elected lawmakers," is
doubtless to Dred Scott, Pollack, and the depression cases. These
are the familiar instances of judicial braking, i.e., occasions when
the Court has employed the power of judicial review of federal
laws to heave sand into the congressional cogwheels. But these
cases do not begin to exhaust the occasions of judicial review,
least of all with respect to the invalidation of state laws. And
Brown is by no means the first instance where judicial review of
state laws was employed to initiate social reform rather than to
retard it. In the field of commerce, the Marshall Court applied the
Constitution far in advance of congressional action and in the teeth
of widespread state statutes to extend protection of private economic
29. P. 129.
30. Pp. 78, 199.

194

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 63

interests against state invasion and interference. In a most scholarly
article, Professor W. H. Mann has recently recapitulated the innovative actions of the Marshall Court in this field:
"[L] egal concepts of 'commerce' which had the effect of designating constitutional protections against state invasion and
interference have dominated adjudications dealing with the
constitutional authority of the commerce clause. Congress'
powers to effectuate national policy through regulation remained in the background ....
"The commerce clause has not only been used in constitutional adjudication to curb state powers in order to secure the existence of national powers; it has also served to secure for the
Supreme Court the jurisdictional authority to nationalize and
enforce private rights . . .31
More recently, but well before Brown, the Court advanced first
amendment claims of groups and individuals against the popular
will, contradicting the legislative will, and forcing the states to
make their property available to those who found no favor with
"representative" assemblies.8 2 As previously noted, the Court
moved to broaden the franchise beyond the demonstrated desires
of state legislatures, forcing the abandonment of white primaries
and state practices which were at least as "familiar" as segregation
laws. 8 In holding the racially restrictive covenants unenforceable,
the Court cut the ground from under a settled convention widely
employed throughout the country, and it cast into limbo a piece
of the common law which was indeed familiar and established: It
acted, of course, without the approval or support of state legislation, and contrary to traditional common-law practice. Similarly,
protection of the criminally accused has been advanced by the
Court over settled state practice and statutes.8 4 The examples could
31. Mann, The Marshall Court: Nationalization of Private Rights and Personal
Liberty From the Authority of the Commerce Clause, 38 IND. L.J. 117-18 (1963).
32. See, e.g., the pre-1954 cases of Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
33. See note 20 supra.
34. See, e.g., the pre-1954 involuntary confession cases: Harris v. South Carolina,
338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 US. 227
(1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Pre-1954 right to counsel cases,
reforming state laws and practices, include: Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948);
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947);
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); House
v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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be multiplied. Therefore, whether or not the Court generally
ought to leave reform to the legislatures, the desegregation cases are
by no means the first occasion that the Court has refused to do so.
Indeed, it is precisely because judicial supremacy has occasionally
operated to instigate reform that sociologists are sometimes incorrect in denigrating the law as a mere reflection of established
folkways.
These matters aside, this book is not likely to convince the
political skeptic that a decent regard for democratic principles
requires an interminable waiting upon the doubtful consciences
of supine state legislatures. Many of these legislatures are neither
well-composed nor disposed to afford protection to the civil rights
and liberties of beleaguered minorities, and they have scarcely
conducted themselves over the years with any considerable distinction. Indeed, until the franchise is more generally available, and
until the implications of Baker v. Carr are fulfilled, it is doubtful
that state legislation can be regarded even as representative.
We are, of course, entitled to be troubled by the power implicit
in the doctrine of judicial supremacy (although less so as it
regards the states), and we may not be able fully to reconcile its
presence with the theory of representative democracy. Professor
Hyneman is quite right in reminding us of the difficulty. At times,
and with respect to certain issues, however, the necessity for the
exercise of that power has reflected more ruefully on the inertia
of our democratic assemblies and ourselves than it has on the
Supreme Court. In any case, it is extremely doubtful that history
will condemn the doctrine because of its particular involvement
in the desegregation cases.
William W. Van Alstyne,
Professor of Law,
Duke University School of Law

